IT/OT Segmentation Reference Architecture

A zone-and-conduit reference architecture for a pipeline OT environment: five zones, and the specific conduits between them worth naming individually rather than treating the boundary as a single firewall.

This diagram lays out five zones, from Corporate/IT through OT Supervisory and OT Control to Safety, and the conduits between them, built around the two failure patterns that show up most often in real segmentation reviews: a historian export that should be a narrow one-way conduit, and vendor remote access that should stop at the supervisory zone rather than reaching Control or Safety directly. It's a generic reference model, not a specific network's as-built diagram, useful as a starting point for describing where a real environment's segmentation matches this shape and where it doesn't.

IT/OT segmentation reference architectureCorporate/IT and DMZ zones connect via general business traffic. The DMZ and OT Supervisory zone connect via two separate conduits: a one-way historian export flowing from OT Supervisory to the DMZ, and a time-boxed, monitored vendor remote-access path flowing from the DMZ into OT Supervisory only. OT Supervisory and OT Control connect via a controlled, logged engineering-access conduit. OT Control and the Safety zone have no routine traffic between them.Corporate / ITERP & emailReporting dashboards1DMZHistorian relayVendor jump host23OT SupervisoryHMI & eng. workstationsPrimary historian4OT ControlPLCs / RTUsSafetySIS

Diagram scrolls horizontally on narrow screens.

What the numbered conduits mean

1. Corporate / IT ↔ DMZ
General business traffic, stopping at the DMZ boundary rather than reaching further into the OT side directly.
2. OT Supervisory → DMZ (one-way)
The historian's process-data export. Built correctly, it's a narrow, one-directional conduit: data flows out, nothing flows back in. This is the most common finding in a real segmentation review, built the way time pressure usually produces it: a dual-homed server with broader access than the export function needs.
3. DMZ → OT Supervisory (vendor remote access)
A jump host or VPN path for vendor and integrator support, time-boxed and monitored, and reaching no further than the supervisory zone. The gap opens when this access stays broader or longer-lived than the commissioning project that originally justified it.
4. OT Supervisory ↔ OT Control
Engineering access to controllers, controlled and logged rather than left open the way a flat network would leave it.
OT Control ↔ Safety: no routine traffic
The Safety Instrumented System is isolated by design. There's no numbered conduit here because the point is the absence of one, not a restricted version of one.

Where a real network usually diverges

Two gaps against this model show up more than any others: a historian built as a broad dual-homed bridge instead of conduit 2's narrow one-way path, and vendor remote access left reaching further, or staying open longer, than conduit 3's time-boxed design calls for. Both are covered in more detail in How to verify IT/OT segmentation in operational networks, and both are what a segmentation design and review engagement checks first.

This is a generic reference model built around IEC 62443's zone-and-conduit concept, not a specific operator's as-built network. Last verified 2026-09-23.

Check a design against this model

We'll discuss your sites, the question you need answered, and the scope of the work. No technical documents needed for the call.

Still working out where to start? Take the readiness check.